MILITARY RELATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN

Z E S Z Y T Y N A U K O W E WYŻSZEJ SZKOŁY INFORMATYKI, ZARZĄDZANIA I ADMINISTRACJI W WARSZAWIE t. 15, z. 4(41) 2017 ISSN 1641 9707 s. 146 154 Ireneusz TOPOLSKI 1 MILITARY RELATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN 1992 2002 This article analyzes the principal part of relations between Russia and the USA in the period 1992 2002. Only the most important issues in military relations between the Federation and the United States of America have been characterized. Firstly, military security issues had a priority in US policy towards Russia. Secondly, in the least degree, the asymmetry of potentials between the two states occurred at the military level. Particular emphasis was placed on two issues, i.e. arms control and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Two hypotheses have been verified in this article. First of all, the reduction of the strategic nuclear potential by Russia was largely driven by financial considerations. Secondly, in the US the proliferation of weapons and technologies of mass destruction and arms exports by the Federation were perceived as an important problem for the state s military security. Keywords: Russian Federation, United States of America, foreign policy, nuclear weapons, arms control, military security. The problem of limiting strategic nuclear forces and the missile defense system in 1992 2002 played the most important role in relations between Russia and the United States. The Federation remained the only state that could destroy the US as a result of a nuclear attack, thus it posed a potential threat to its military security 2. Russia, as the legal successor of the USSR, took over all its disarmament commitments, including the treaties: On the restriction of missile defense systems (ABM) and On the reduction of strategic armaments (START I). At the same time, the United States and the Federation continued negotiations on 1 Dr hab. Ireneusz Topolski, Faculty of Political Science, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University. Kontakt z autorem poprzez redakcję ZN WSIZiA w Warszawie: zeszytynaukowe@ dobrauczelnia.pl. 2 Rossijsko-amierikanskije otnoszenija na rubieże wiekow, Washington Moskwa 2000, p. 28, 59; W. Annienkow, O. Iwanow, W. Krugłow, A. Moisiejew, Wojennaja..., s. 280.

Military relations of the Russian Federation and the United States of America 147 limiting strategic armaments, which led to the signing of the Lisbon Protocol on START 23 and its subsequent ratification by Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan on January 23, 1992, and on January 3, 1993, on the START II Agreement, and May 24, 2002, the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SORT) 3. According to Russia, the implementation of the provisions of START I 4 and START II 5 treaties placed it in a position inconvenient to the United States. The US could thus gain a quality and quantity advantage on the level of strategic nuclear weapons 6. The US Senate ratified the START II system on January 27, 1996. However, the implementation of the provisions of the reduction under the START treaties and especially the START II caused some complications on the part of the Federation. The State Duma refused to ratify the START II treaty, making its decision conditional upon the United States observing the ABM agreement of 1972 and broader security issues, including NATO enlargement and the Balkan crisis 7. At the Clinton-Yeltsin Summit in Helsinki in March 1997, a package of amendments to the START II treaty was agreed. The presidents guidelines took the form of a legal agreement, i.e. the START II Protocol and several related documents, which were signed by foreign ministers of both states on 26 September 1997 in New York. Due to the difficult economic situation in Russia, the Protocol postponed the deadline for the final reduction of START II to December 31, 2007, and the provisional START I reduction until December 31, 2004. Finally, on December 5, 2001, seven years after the entry into force of the START I Treaty, the third and final phase of the reduction ended 8. 3 I. Topolski, Polityka Federacji Rosyjskiej wobec państw Europy Wschodniej, Lublin 2013, p. 101 102; I. Topolski, Siła militarna w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej, Lublin 2004, s. 217; Rossijskaja Fiedieracya: biezopasnost i wojennoje sotrudniczestwo, Moskwa 1995, p. 295; W. Łaptiew, Rossijsko-amierikanskije otnoszenija [w:] Wnieszniaja politika i dipłomatija Rossijskoj Fiedieracyi. Uczebnik, red. A. Panow, Moskwa 2010, p. 250. 4 START I it assumed a reduction of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to the level of 1,600 units, and the number of warheads up to 6,000. 5 START II it assumed ultimately to reduce the nuclear charges installed on the means of transmission to the level of 3000-3500 and eliminate all intercontinental ballistic missile with, multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV ICBM) and reduction sealaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) (to 1700 1750 warheads). 6 J. Goldblat, Arms Control. A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, London Thousand Oaks New Delhi 1994, pp. 591 625, 673 675, 697 711; I. Topolski, Siła..., s. 217; P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Wymiar militarny, Warszawa 2012, p. 338 342. 7 Rossijsko-amierikanskije..., p. 83 85; I. Topolski, Kontrola i redukcja zbrojeń [w:] Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne, red. M. Pietraś, Lublin 2006, p. 381; S.N. Kile, Kontrola i nierozprzestrzenianie zbrojeń nuklearnych, [w:] Kontrola zbrojeń. Rozbrojenie u progu XXI wieku, red. A.D. Rotfeld, Warszawa 2002, s. 88. 8 I. Topolski, Siła..., p. 218 219.

148 Ireneusz TOPOLSKI On 14 th April 2000 the State Duma ratified the START II treaty. The ratification has been subject to certain conditions, including the government was required to negotiate START III, which could correct the deficiencies of START II, and it was claimed that the breach of the ABM system by the US would result in the withdrawal of the FR from the START II system. It should also be pointed out that the proposal put forward by President Vladimir Putin to reduce strategic nuclear charges to the level of 1500 was rejected by the US 9. Initial arrangements for the START III arrangement were made during the meeting of Boris Yeltsin and Billy Clinton in Helsinki in March 1997. They were formalized later by signing by the Foreign Ministers of the Federation and the USA on 26 th September 1997 in the New York Agreement on START III. It provided that under this treaty the number of nuclear warheads would be reduced to 2000 2500 for each party. The period of its implementation was to run in parallel with the prolonged implementation of the START II system by the end of December 2007. In 1999 both countries expressed interest in continuing negotiations on the START III agreement, but the US made them dependent on the ratification of the START II Treaty. However, the final shape of the Treaty was not agreed, which contributed to the discontinuation of the negotiations in 2002 10. At the Bush-Putin Summit on 13 th 15 th November 2001 in Washington and Crawford, Texas, the President of the United States made a unilateral declaration to reduce nuclear charges to a ceiling of 1700 2200 in a decade. Vladimir Putin confirmed that the Federation would repay a similar amount of reduction. On 24 th May 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the SORT treaty in Moscow, also known as the Moscow Treaty. The United States and Russia have committed that by 31 st December 2012, the sumaristic number of loads for each party will not exceed 1700 2200 heads. The US also guaranteed the possibility of storage of heads (about 2,000), beyond the limits set out in the Treaty. These charges did not have full combat readiness but were also not destroyed to the level of so-called irreversibility. It was also stated that the START I Treaty will continue to apply. The SORT Agreement entered into force on 1st June 2003 11. 9 S. N. Kile, Kontrola..., p. 91; I. Topolski, Kontrola..., s. 381; J. Kaczmarski, Polityka Federacji Rosyjskiej wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki [w:] Polityka zagraniczna Rosji, red. S. Bieleń, Warszawa 2008, p. 61 62; P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, Bezpieczeństwo..., p. 341 342. 10 I. Topolski, Siła..., p. 219. 11 S. N. Kile, Kontrola..., p. 92, 107; I. Topolski, Siła..., s. 220-221; Dogowor mieżdu Rossijskoj Fiedieraciej i Sojediniennymi Sztatami Amieriki o sokraszczienii stratiegiczieskich nastupatielnych potienciałow, Informacyonnyj Biullietien MSZ FR, 27 maja 2002, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ ns-dvbr.nsf/50ce23af9ceacf46432569ea0 0361254/432569d80022...; P. Durys, P. Pacholski, Przegląd światowego procesu rozbrojeniowego. 2001 rok, Warszawa 2002, p. 30 31; J. Sawicz, M. Orliński, P. Pacholski, S. Cugier, Broń jądrowa i środki przenoszenia [w:] Przegląd światowego procesu rozbrojeniowego. 2002 rok, red. L. Kościuk, Warszawa 2003, p. 160 161; M. Kaczmarski,

Military relations of the Russian Federation and the United States of America 149 The Russia USA summit itself in May 2002 was described by Dmitry Trenin as the end of the Cold War. In his opinion, Russia officially admitted that it is not able to match the United States. This means the possibility of moving away from aspiration by the Russian Federation to the role of a world power and reflects the real position of Russia in the world 12. The ABM system was created during the Cold War confrontation. It has become the cornerstone of the strategic balance between the US and the USSR, based on the guarantee of mutual destruction. The effective limitation of the ABM system s resources was to stop the arms race and lead to a reduction of the danger of a nuclear war. In the bipolar system, these principles worked well, but after its disintegration, they began to arouse controversy in the United States as obsolete. The planned construction of the NMD 13 was to protect the US against a potential nuclear attack from the so-called Hultay countries, including North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. In fact, Russia s territory was more vulnerable than the United States to ballistic missile attacks by a potential enemy that was close to its southern borders 14. The issue of building a missile defense system has been one of the largest controversies in relations between the United States and Russia since 1993. During this period, the US proposed an explanation of the scope of the ABM system. This involved the possibility of discussing some changes to the arrangement s provisions and defining the boundary in which the sub-strategic missile defense system would be located. Russia strongly opposed all kinds of changes and modifications 15. The Federation treated the ABM system through the prism of strategic balance with the United States. The possibility of its unilateral termination by the United States was perceived in Russia as a threat to undermine the whole system of strategic security. The United States activities in the Federation were considered as undermining the strategic balance and gaining US military supremacy, as well as providing the US with a security status. Russia related this issue to the ratification of START II, and later the possibility of its termination. There have also been threats. It was argued that building a hermetic missile shield is unrealistic, also NMD is not an effective barrier against Russian ballistic missiles 16. Problem zbrojeń i rozbrojenia, [w:] Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie, red. R. Zięba, Warszawa 2008, p. 526 527. 12 I. Topolski, Siła..., p. 222. 13 NMD (National missile defense). 14 I. Topolski, Siła..., p. 222. 15 Ibidem. 16 Zob. Rossijsko-amierikanskije..., p. 28; Rossijskaja Fiedieracyja..., s. 306 308; A.D. Rotfeld, Przyszłość kontroli zbrojeń [w:] Kontrola zbrojeń. Rozbrojenie u progu XXI wieku, red. A.D. Rotfeld, Warszawa 2002, p. 18 20; I. Topolski, Siła..., p. 222 223; S.N. Kile, Kontrola..., p. 100 101.

150 Ireneusz TOPOLSKI The controversy between the US and the Russian Federation aroused discrepancies, making it impossible to conclude a reconstruction allowing for trials with defensive rockets that did not violate the 1972 ABM agreement. In September 1996, the terms of the agreement were defined, and in October the Federation refused to sign it. During the Clinton-Yeltsin Summit in Helsinki in March 1997, the two presidents agreed on a joint declaration on the guidelines for the demarcation of strategic missile-missile defense systems from missile defense systems of theater activities. On this basis, a formal agreement was reached, which was signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USA, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine on 26 th September 1997 in New York. In addition, documents were signed, including the Memorandum of Understanding on Succession (MOUS). In the US, the Memorandum caused controversy between the administration of Bill Clinton and representatives of the Republican Party in Congress, which concerned the continued existence of the ABM agreement in force. According to the Republicans, the ABM system expired and did not remain in force until the Senate MOUS or similar document ratified it 17. The evolution of the Federation s position towards the US plans became apparent during the Clinton-Putin summit in June 2000 in Moscow. The two presidents issued a joint statement which stated that ABM is the cornerstone of strategic stability and that the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is changing the strategic situation qualitatively 18. On 13 th December 2001, the United States formally informed the Federation of its intention to withdraw from the ABM after six months. President George W. Bush stressed that both states do not threaten each other, and the US must be free to move forward in the development of effective missile defense, especially against terrorists and rascal states. The ABM system has not formally been in force since 13 th June 2002. The consequence of this was Russia s announcement in June 2002 that he no longer feels obliged by the provisions of the START II treaty. The Federation authorities expressed regret, but at the same time acknowledged US law to such a step. Vladimir Putin expressed fears that such an action could lead to the extension of the arms race to space, but he did not see a military threat to Russia. To a large extent, these calm reactions were connected with the approval of the United States for a significant reduction in the strategic potential of the military forces and the promise of upgrading Russia NATO cooperation to a higher level 19. 17 S.N. Kile, Kontrola..., p. 92; 107; J. Kaczmarski, Polityka..., s. 62-63; P. Durys, P. Pacholski, Przegląd..., p. 8 9; J. Sawicz, M. Orliński, P. Pacholski, S. Cugier, Broń..., p. 159. 18 I. Topolski, Siła..., p. 224. 19 S.N. Kile, Kontrola..., p. 92; 107; J. Kaczmarski, Polityka..., p. 62 63; P. Durys, P. Pacholski, Przegląd..., p. 8 9; J. Sawicz, M. Orliński, P. Pacholski, S. Cugier, Broń..., p. 159.

Military relations of the Russian Federation and the United States of America 151 To some extent, the level of security was improved by the memorandum of agreement on the notification of missile and space vehicle launches concluded by the Foreign Ministers of the United States and Russia on December 16, 2000. It provided for the provision of relevant information before and after the missile launch 20. In March 2002, the Pentagon report on the strategic US military forces was released. Seven countries, including Russia, have been listed as potential targets for the US nuclear retaliation 21. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and export of conventional weapons. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction played an important role in the relations between the Federation and the USA in 1992 2002. Both countries perceived the importance and role of the problem differently. In the United States, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was the main security problem after the end of the Cold War and the largest real immediate threat, except international terrorism. This was connected with Russia s possession, in addition to nuclear charges and means of transporting them, also with significant stocks of materials, appropriate technologies and extensive knowledge necessary to create weapons of mass destruction. To this end, the US is striving to ensure that both weapons, production technologies, and scientists are not found in third countries. In the Federation, greater importance was attached to the existing threats to its security, which resulted from the socio-economic collapse of the state and the unstable situation at the borders, than potential ones related to the proliferation of dangerous technologies 22. Discrepancies from this background were the source of potential conflicts between the Federation and the USA. In 1991, the implementation of the Cooperative Reduction of Threats Program (CTR), also known as the Nunna-Lugara program, was launched. He was directed to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. He assumed the financial and technological assistance of the United States to secure post-soviet nuclear weapons and its non-proliferation, as well as the destruction of chemical weapons and chemical and biological weapon production facilities. An important problem was also the phenomenon of the brain drain from Russia. As part of the CTR program, international science and technology centers were maintained that employed civilian scientists and engineers previously working on the development of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The US Department of Energy and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (Minatom), based on an agree- 20 I. Topolski, Siła..., p. 225. 21 Rocznik Strategiczny 2002/2003, Warszawa 2003, p. 218. 22 Topolski, Siła..., s. 225.

152 Ireneusz TOPOLSKI ment of 1998, established the Nuclear Cities Initiative. According to it, the Department was to organize training and support for the development of commercial enterprises in ten closed nuclear cities in Russia, which threatened to lay off workers. In 1999, funds were restricted by the US due to their economic unprofitability and probable transfer of funds to Russian scientists still working on defense programs 23. Disputes in the relations between the two countries aroused cooperation in the field of nuclear and rocket-space technology of Russia with China, India, and especially with rascal countries. The United States, among others In exchange for the Federation s withdrawal from cooperation in specific areas with India, they promised bilateral cooperation in the field of space technology. However, in the case of further continuation of supplies, they imposed sanctions on Russia s space program. The biggest controversy was the contract signed with Iran in January 1995 for the construction of the power unit of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr. It also assumed delivery of reactors. The US accused the Federation that nuclear cooperation with Iran could lead to the construction of nuclear weapons by that country. The Russian-Iranian cooperation in the field of nuclear energy caused the United States to introduce sanctions against certain Russian universities, research institutes and companies. The problem of Russia s cooperation with Iran had a very large impact on the strategic partnership between the USA and the Federation 24. The United States strongly opposed military cooperation, weapons supplies and dual-purpose technologies to states recognized as threatening national and international security. In addition to Iran, Iraq, KRL-D, Libya, Syria and Kuba were also mentioned. The Federation strongly opposed this position. In Russia s relations with these countries, the issues of supply of military technology, debt repayment, and cooperation in the field of energy prevailed. US opposition to arms exports to other countries was treated by Russia as deliberate actions aimed at preventing its markets from developed technologies and eliminating them as a potential competitor on the arms market. It should be emphasized that for Russia, arms exports were one of the sources of hard currency acquisition. 23 S.N. Kile, Kontrola..., p. 108 110; J. Sawicz, M. Orliński, P. Pacholski, S. Cugier, Broń..., p. 161 162; Rocznik Strategiczny 1997/98, Warszawa 1998, s. 36. 24 I. Topolski, Siła..., p. 225 227; R. Sakwa, Russian politics and society, Second edition, London, New York 1996, s. 293; Rossijsko-amierikanskije..., s. 42; Rocznik Strategiczny 2002/2003, Warszawa 2003, p. 197 198, 214 217; A. D. Rotfeld, Przyszłość..., p. 22; Rossija w mirowoj torgowle orużyjem: stratiegija, politika, ekonomika, red. E.J. Pier, D.W. Trenin, Moskwa 1996; P. Sherman, Russian Policy Toward the United States [in:] Russian Foreign Policy since 1990, P. Shearman (ed.), Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford 1995, p. 121.

Military relations of the Russian Federation and the United States of America 153 * * * After the collapse of the USSR, Russia and the United States could maintain the equal relations only on the military level. A large asymmetry of potentials did not occur only in the case of nuclear weapons. The research hypotheses adopted in this article have been confirmed, namely, firstly the reduction of the strategic nuclear potential by Russia was largely forced by financial considerations. Secondly, in the US the proliferation of weapons and technologies of mass destruction and arms exports by the Federation were perceived as an important problem for the military security of the state. Although the approach to the analyzed problems in the United States and the Federation differed, in the discussed period both countries were forced to cooperate on a military level. Russia s consent to the reduction of the strategic nuclear potential, especially under the SORT treaty, resulted from the poor condition of a part of the nuclear arsenal, as well as the lack of financial resources to maintain it at that level. Although after the end of the Cold War, the Federation was the only state that could have destroyed the state as a result of a nuclear-weapon attack, policy-makers in the US paid attention to other issues. Particular concerns in the United States aroused the possibility of transferring mainly mass-destruction technologies, especially nuclear ones, to states that have owned or developed nuclear weapons programs. In addition, concerns in the USA were also caused by the supply of modern and highly technologically advanced conventional weapon systems. Bibliography 1. Dogowor mieżdu Rossijskoj Fiedieraciej i Sojediniennymi Sztatami Amieriki o sokraszczienii stratiegiczieskich nastupatielnych potienciałow, Informacyonnyj Biullietien MSZ FR, 27 maja 2002, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/50ce23af9ceacf46432569ea0 0361254/432569d80022... 2. Durys P., Pacholski P., Przegląd światowego procesu rozbrojeniowego. 2001 rok, Warszawa 2002. 3. Goldblat J., Arms Control. A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, London Thousand Oaks New Delhi 1994. 4. Kaczmarski J., Polityka Federacji Rosyjskiej wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki [w:] Polityka zagraniczna Rosji, red. S. Bieleń, Warszawa 2008. 5. Kaczmarski M., Problem zbrojeń i rozbrojenia [w:] Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie, red. R. Zięba, Warszawa 2008. 6. Kile S.N., Kontrola i nierozprzestrzenianie zbrojeń nuklearnych [w:] Kontrola zbrojeń. Rozbrojenie u progu XXI wieku, red. A.D. Rotfeld, Warszawa 2002. 7. Łaptiew W., Rossijsko-amierikanskije otnoszenija [w:] Wnieszniaja politika i dipłomatija Rossijskoj Fiedieracyi. Uczebnik, red. A. Panow, Moskwa 2010. 8. Rocznik Strategiczny 1997/98, Warszawa 1998. 9. Rocznik Strategiczny 2002/2003, Warszawa 2003.

154 Ireneusz TOPOLSKI 10. Rossija w mirowoj torgowle orużyjem: stratiegija, politika, ekonomika, red. E.J. Pier, D.W. Trenin, Moskwa 1996. 11. Rossijskaja Fiedieracya: biezopasnost i wojennoje sotrudniczestwo, Moskwa 1995. 12. Rossijsko-amierikanskije otnoszenija na rubieże wiekow, Washington Moskwa 2000. 13. Rotfeld A.D., Przyszłość kontroli zbrojeń [w:] Kontrola zbrojeń. Rozbrojenie u progu XXI wieku, red. A.D. Rotfeld, Warszawa 2002. 14. Sakwa R., Russian politics and society, Second edition, London, New York 1996. 15. Sawicz J., Orliński M., Pacholski P., Cugier S., Broń jądrowa i środki przenoszenia [w:] Przegląd światowego procesu rozbrojeniowego. 2002 rok, red. L. Kościuk, Warszawa 2003. 16. Sherman P., Russian Policy Toward the United States [in:] Russian Foreign Policy since 1990, P. Shearman (ed.), Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford 1995. 17. Topolski I., Kontrola i redukcja zbrojeń [w:] Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne, red. M. Pietraś, Lublin 2006. 18. Topolski I., Polityka Federacji Rosyjskiej wobec państw Europy Wschodniej, Lublin 2013. 19. Topolski I., Siła militarna w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej, Wyd. UMCS, Lublin 2004. 20. Żurawski P. vel Grajewski, Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Wymiar militarny, Warszawa 2012. STOSUNKI MILITARNE FEDERACJI ROSYJSKIEJ I STANÓW ZJEDNOCZONYCH AMERYKI W LATACH 1992 2002 Streszczenie Niniejszy artykuł zawiera analizę zasadniczej części stosunków pomiędzy Rosją i USA w okresie 1992 2002. Scharakteryzowane zostały tylko najważniejsze zagadnienia w stosunkach militarnych pomiędzy Federacją i Stanami Zjednoczonymi Ameryki. Po pierwsze, kwestie bezpieczeństwa militarnego 25 mają priorytetowe znaczenie w polityce USA wobec Rosji. Po drugie, w najmniejszym stopniu asymetria potencjałów pomiędzy obu państwami występowała na płaszczyźnie militarnej. Szczególny nacisk został położony na dwie kwestie, tj. kontrolę zbrojeń oraz niedopuszczenie do proliferacji broni masowego rażenia i środków jej przenoszenia. W niniejszym artykule poddano weryfikacji dwie hipotezy. Po pierwsze, redukcja strategicznego potencjału nuklearnego przez Rosję była w znacznym stopniu wymuszona względami finansowymi. Po drugie, w USA postrzegano proliferację broni i technologii masowego rażenia oraz eksport uzbrojenia przez Federację, jako ważny problem dla bezpieczeństwa militarnego państwa. Słowa kluczowe: Federacja Rosyjska, Stany Zjednoczone Ameryki, polityka zagraniczna, broń nuklearna, kontrola zbrojeń, bezpieczeństwo militarne. Artykuł otrzymano: 14 grudnia 2017 r. Zaakceptowano do druku: 15 stycznia 2018 r. 25 Elity polityczne w USA postrzegają Rosję, jako drugorzędne mocarstwo we wszystkich ważnych sferach stosunków międzynarodowych, za wyjątkiem militarno-strategicznej, co jest związane z ogromnym potencjałem jądrowym Federacji.